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Dynamic Profit Maximization of Cognitive Mobile
Virtual Network Operator
Shuqin Li, Member, IEEE, Jianwei Huang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Shuo-Yen Robert Li, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We study the profit maximization problem of a cognitive virtual network operator in a dynamic network environment. We
consider a downlink OFDM communication system with various network dynamics, including dynamic user demands, uncertain sensing
spectrum resources, dynamic spectrum prices, and time-varying channel conditions. In addition, heterogenous users and imperfect
sensing technology are incorporated to make the network model more realistic. By exploring the special structural of the problem,
we develop a low-complexity on-line control policies that determine pricing and resource scheduling without knowing the statistics of
dynamic network parameters. We show that the proposed algorithms can achieve arbitrarily close to the optimal profit with a proper
trade-off with the queuing delay.
Index Terms—Cognitive Radio, Profit Maximization, Pricing, Virtual Network Operator.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
The limited wireless spectrum is becoming a bottleneck for
meeting today’s fast growing demands for wireless data ser-
vices. More specifically, there is very little spectrum left that
can be licensed to new wireless services and applications.
However, extensive field measurements [2] showed that much
of the licensed spectrum remains idle most of the time, even
in densely populated metropolitan areas such as New York
City and Chicago. A potential way to solve this dilemma is to
manage and utilize the licensed spectrum resource in a more
efficient way.
This is why the concept of Dynamic Spectrum Access
(DSA) has received enthusiastic support from governments
and industries worldwide [3]–[5]. We can roughly classify
various DSA approaches into two main categories: the spec-
trum sensing based ones and the spectrum leasing (or market)
based ones. The first category indicates a hierarchical access
model, where unlicensed secondary users opportunistically
access the under-utilized part of the licensed spectrum, with
controlled interference to the licensed primary users. During
this process, spectrum sensing helps the secondary users to
detect the currently available spectrum resource. In contrast,
the second category relates to a dynamic exclusive use model,
which allows licensees to trade spectrum usage right to the
secondary users. In both categories, it is possible to have a
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secondary operator coordinating the transmissions of multiple
secondary users.
There are pros and cons for both DSA categories. Spectrum
sensing detects and identifies the available unused licensed
spectrum through technologies such as beacons, geolocation
system, and cognitive radio. Form the secondary operator’s
perspective, the spectrum acquired by sensing is an unreliable
resource, since it cannot determine how much resource is
available before sensing. Furthermore, imperfect sensing may
lead to collisions with primary users, and thus reduce the
incentives for the licensee to share the spectrum. Therefore
the secondary operator needs to carefully design sensing and
access algorithm to control the collision probability under an
acceptable level. In dynamic spectrum leasing, a secondary
operator acquires the exclusive right to use spectrum within
a limited time period by paying the corresponding leasing
price. Thus the spectrum acquired by spectrum leasing is a
reliable resource. However, the cost can be high compared
to the spectrum sensing cost, and is dynamically changing
according to the demand and supply relationship in the market.
In this paper, we will consider a hybrid model, where a
secondary operator obtains resources from the primary li-
censees through both spectrum sensing and dynamic spectrum
leasing, and provides services to the secondary unlicensed
users. Our study is motivated by [6], [7], in which the
authors introduced the new concept of Cognitive Mobile
Virtual Network Operator (C-MVNO). The C-MVNO is a
generalization of the existing business model of MVNO [8],
which refers to the network operator who does not own a
licensed frequency spectrum or even wireless infrastructure,
but resells wireless services under its own brand name. The
MVNO business model has been very successful after more
than 10 years’ development, and there are more than 600
MVNOs today [9], [10]. The C-MVNO model generalizes the
MVNO model with DSA technologies, which allow the virtual
operator to obtain spectrum resources through both spectrum
sensing and leasing. The C-MVNO model can be applied to
a wild range of wireless scenarios. One example is the IEEE
802.22 standard [11], which suggests that the cognitive radio
2network using white space in TV spectrum will operate on
a point to multipoint basis (i.e., a base station to customer-
premises equipments). Such a secondary base station can be
operated by a C-MVNO.
The key difference between our work and the ones in
[6], [7] is that we study a much more realistic dynamic
network in this paper. In [6], [7], the authors formulated the
problem based on a static network scenario, and provided
interesting equilibrium results through a one-shot Stackelberg
game. However, the real network is highly dynamic. For
example, users arrive and leave the systems randomly, the
statistics of spectrum availability changes over time, and the
spectrum-sensing results are imperfect. Also the leasing price
is often unpredictable and changing from time to time. These
dynamics and realistic concerns make the network model and
the corresponding analysis rather challenging.
In this paper, we focus on the profit maximization problem
for C-MVNO in a dynamic network scenario. Our key results
and contributions are summarized as follows.
• A dynamic network decision model: Our model incor-
porates various key dynamic aspects of a cognitive radio
network and the dynamic decision process of a C-MVNO.
We model sensing channel availability, leasing market
price, and channel conditions as exogenous stochastic
processes.
• Dynamic user demands: We allow users to dynamically
join the network with random demands (file sizes). The
demand is affected by both the transmission prices (deci-
sion variables) and market states (exogenous stochastics).
• Realistic cognitive radio model: We incorporate various
practical issues such as imperfect spectrum sensing, pri-
mary users’ collision tolerance, and sensing technology
selection. The operator needs to choose a sensing tech-
nology to trade-off between cost and performance.
• A low-complexity on-line control policy: By exploiting
the special structure of the problem, we design a low-
complexity on-line pricing and resource allocation policy,
which can achieve arbitrarily close to the operator’s
optimal profit. The policy does not require precise in-
formation of the dynamic network parameters, has a low
system overhead, and is easy to implement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the related work. In Section 3, we
introduce the system model. Section 4 describes the problem
formulation. In Section 5, we propose the profit maximization
control (PMC) policy for homogeneous users and analyze its
performance. We further extend profit maximization control
policy (M-PMC policy) to heterogeneous users in Section 6.
Section 7 provides simulation results for both PMC and M-
PMC polices. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
Among the vast literature on cognitive radio, we will focus
on the results on operator-oriented cognitive radio networks,
where secondary operators play key roles in terms of coordi-
nating the transmissions of the secondary users. These studies
only started to emerge recently, e.g., [6], [7], [12]–[21]. We
can further classify these studies into two clusters: monopoly
models with one operator, and oligopoly models with multiple
operators.
References [6], [7], [12], [13] studied monopoly models
using the Stackelberg game formulation. Daoud et al. in [12]
proposed a profit-maximizing pricing strategy for uplink power
control problem in wide-band cognitive radio networks. Yu et
al. in [13] proposed a pricing scheme that can guarantee a
fair and efficient power allocation among the secondary users.
References [14]–[21] looked at the oligopoly issues, either
between two operators [14], [15] or among many operators
[16]–[21]. For the case of two operators, Jia and Zhang in
[14] proposed a non-cooperative two-stage game model to
study the duopoly competition. Duan et al. in [15] formulated
the economic interaction among the spectrum owner, two
secondary operators and the users as a three-stage game. For
the case of many operators, Ileri et al. in [16] developed a
non-cooperative game to model competition of operators in a
mixed commons/property-rights regime under the regulation of
a spectrum policy server. Elias and Martignon in [17] showed
that polynomial pricing functions lead to unique and efficient
Nash equilibrium for the two-stage Stackelberg game between
network operators and secondary users. Niyato et al. in [18]
formulated an evolutionary game for modeling the dynamics of
a multiple-seller, multiple-buyer spectrum trading market. In
addition, several auction mechanisms were proposed to study
the investment problems of cognitive network operators (e.g.,
[19]–[21]).
All results mentioned above considered a rather static
network model. In contrast, our work adopts a dynamic
network model to characterize the stochastic nature of wireless
networks. We will focus on a monopoly model in this paper.
In this paper, we use Lyapunov stochastic optimization
to show the optimality and stability of the proposed profit
maximizing control algorithms. Several closely related pre-
vious results applying Lyaunov stochastic optimization to
wireless networks include [22]–[24]. Huang and Neely in [22]
considered revenue maximization problem for a conventional
wireless access point without considering the cognitive radio
technologies. Urgaonkar and Neely in [23] and Lotfinezhad
et al. in [24] studied cognitive radio networks based on
a user-oriented approach, by designing joint scheduling and
resource allocation algorithms to maximize the utility of a
group of secondary users. Our paper focused on an operator-
oriented approach to address profit maximization problem. In
particular, we need to deal with the combinatorial problem of
channel selection and channel assignment that usually leads to
a high computational complexity. By discovering and utilizing
the special problem structure, we design a low-complexity
algorithm that is suitable for online implementation.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a C-MVNO that provides wireless communications
services to its own secondary users by acquiring spectrum
resource from some spectrum owner. For example, Google
may acquire spectrum from AT&T to provide its own wireless
services through the C-MVNO model. The spectrum owner’s
spectrum can be divided into two types: the sensing band and
3the leasing band. In the sensing band, AT&T serves its own
primary users, but allows Google to identify available spec-
trum in this band through spectrum sensing without explicit
communications with AT&T. In the leasing band, AT&T will
does not allow spectrum sensing, and will lease the band to
Google for economic returns.
More specifically, we consider a time-slotted OFDM sys-
tem, where the C-MVNO serves the downlink transmissions
from its base station to the secondary users. The system model
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Secondary users randomly arrive at
the secondary network and request files with random sizes
to be downloaded from the base station. This requested files
are queued at the server in the base station until they are
successfully transmitted to the requesting users.
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Fig. 1. Business model of the operator (Cognitive Virtual
Network Operator).
The rest of the section introduces each part of the system
model in more details. The C-MVNO (or “operator” for
simplicity) obtains wireless channels through spectrum sensing
(Sections 3.1 and 3.2) and spectrum leasing (Section 3.3), and
allocates power over the obtained channels (Section 3.4). Sec-
ondary users dynamically arrive and request file downloading
services (based on the demand model in Section 3.5), and we
model the requests as a queue (Section 3.6).
3.1 Imperfect Spectrum Sensing
Sensing band Bsmax
∆
= {1, . . . , Bsmax} includes all channels
that the spectrum owner allows sensing by the operator.1 We
define the state of a channel i ∈ Bsmax(t) in time slot t as
Si(t), which equals 0 if channel i is busy (being used by a
primary user), and equals 1 if channel i is idle.
We assume that Si(t) is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable,
with an idle probability p0 ∈ (0, 1) and a busy probability
1− p0. This approximates the reality well if the time slots for
secondary transmissions are sufficiently long or the primary
transmissions are highly bursty [27]. (We will further study
1. The operator will collect the sensing information from a sensor network
or geolocation database and provide it to its users, i.e., providing “sensing
as service” [25], [26]. This means that the network can accommodate
legacy mobile devices without cognitive radio capabilities. For more detailed
discussions, see [7].
the general Markovian model in Section 5.5.) We define the
sensing state of a channel i ∈ Bsmax in time slot t as Wi(t),
which equals to 0 if channel i is sensed busy, and 1 if sensed
idle.
Notice that Wi(t) may not equal to Si(t) due to imperfect
sensing. The accuracy of spectrum sensing depends on the
sensing technology [28]. If we denote Cs as the sensing cost
(per channel)2, then we can write the false alarm probability as
Pfa(C
s)
∆
= Pr{Wi = 0|Si = 1} (same for all channel i) and
the missed detection probability as Pmd(Cs)
∆
= Pr{Wi =
1|Si = 0} (same for all channel i). Both functions are
decreasing in Cs. Intuitively, a better technology will have
a higher cost Cs, a lower false alarm probability Pfa(Cs),
and a lower missed detection probability Pmd(Cs). We denote
all choices of cost Cs (and thus the corresponding sensing
technologies) by a finite set Cs.
As different channels have different conditions (to be ex-
plained in details in Section 3.4), the operator needs to decide
which channels to sense at the beginning of each time slot.
We use Bs(t) to denote the set of channels sensed by the
operator at time t, which satisfies
Bs(t) ⊆ Bsmax, ∀ t. (1)
3.2 Collision Constraint
Missed detections in spectrum sensing lead to transmission
collisions with the primary users. We denote the collision in
channel i ∈ Bsmax at time t as a binary random variable
Xi(t) ∈ {0, 1}. We have Xi(t)
∆
= (1 − Si(t))Wi(t), i.e., the
collision happens if and only if the channel is busy but is
sensed idle.
To protect primary users’ transmissions, the operator needs
to ensure that the average collision in each channel i does not
exceed a tolerable level ηi (measured in terms of the average
number of collisions per unit time) specified by the spectrum
owner. The tolerable level ηi can be channel specific, since the
primary users in different channels may have different QoS
requirements. We define the time-average number of collision
in channel i as Xi
∆
= limt→∞
1
t
∑t−1
τ=0 E [Xi(τ)]. The collision
constraints are
Xi ≤ ηi, ∀i ∈ B
s
max(t). (2)
3.3 Spectrum Leasing with a Dynamic Market Price
A spectrum owner may have some channels that do not want to
be sensed, for either privacy reasons or the fear of collisions
due to sensing errors. However, these channels may not be
always fully utilized. The spectrum owner can lease the unused
part of these channels to the operator dynamically over time
to earn more revenue. Recall that we denote the set of these
channels as the leasing band Blmax
∆
= {1, . . . , Blmax}. (In
general, we may represent it as Blmax(t), since our model
allows leasing band to be time-varying. For the simplicity of
notations, we denote it as Blmax whenever it is clear.) We use
Bli(t) to denote the set of channels leased by the operator
at time t, which satisfies
Bl(t) ⊆ Blmax, ∀ t. (3)
2. The cost corresponds to, for example, power or time used for sensing.
4These channels will be exclusively used by the operator in the
current time slot. We denote the leasing price per channel as
Cl(t), which stochastically changes according to the supply
and demand relationship in the spectrum market (which might
involve many spectrum owners and operators). It can be
modeled by an exogenous (not affected by this particular
operator’s decisions) random process with countable discrete
states and stationary distribution (not necessarily known by
the operator).
3.4 Power Allocation
In wireless network, there are usually channel fading due
to multipath propagation or shadowing from obstacles. To
combat channel fading, it is necessary for the operator to do
proper power allocation in both sensing channels and leasing
channels to achieve satisfactory data rates. For each channel
i ∈ Bmax
∆
= Bsmax ∪ B
l
max, hi(t) represents its channel gain
in time slot t and follows an i.i.d. distribution over time.
Different channels have independent and possibly different
channel gain distributions. We assume that secondary users
are homogeneous and experience the same channel condition
for the same channel. But channel conditions can be different
in different channels.3 (The heterogenous user scenario will
be further discussed in Section 6.) The operator can measure
hi(t) for each i at the beginning of each slot t, but may not
know the distributions. Let Pi(t) denote the power allocated
to channel i at time t. Since we consider a downlink case
here, the operator needs to satisfy the total power constraint
Pmax at its base station,∑
i∈Bmax
Pi(t) ≤ Pmax, ∀t. (4)
In addition, for a channel i ∈ Bsmax in the sensing band,
we use the binary variable Ii(t)
∆
= Si(t)Wi(t) to denote the
transmission result of a secondary user, i.e., Ii(t) = 1 if
successful (i.e., Si(t) = 1 and Wi(t) = 1) and Ii(t) = 0
otherwise (either not sensed, or sensed busy, or sensed idle
but actually busy). Based on the discussion of the leasing
agreement, we have Ii(t) ≡ 1, i ∈ Blmax for all channel in
leasing band. Then the rate in channel i at time slot t is (based
on the Shannon formula)
ri(t) = Ii(t) log2(1 + hi(t)Pi(t)), (5)
and total transmission rate obtained by the operator is
r(t) =
∑
i∈Bs(t)∩Bl(t)
ri(t). (6)
Furthermore, we assume that the operator has a finite
maximum transmission rate, i.e., r(t) ≤ rmax, ∀t, under any
feasible power allocation.
3.5 Demand Model
We will focus on elastic data traffic in this paper. Secondary
users randomly arrive at the network to request files with
random and finite file sizes (measured in the number of
3. This is the case where the users are located close by, and thus the
downlink channel condition from the base station to the users is user
independent.
packets) from the operator. A user will leave the network
once it has downloaded the complete requested file. The
operator can price the packet transmission dynamically over
time, which will affect the users’ arrival rate. For example, a
higher price at peak time can refrain users from downloading
files, as they can wait until a later time with a lower price.
To model this, we use M(t) to denote the random market
state, which can be measured precisely at the beginning of
each time slot t and can help estimate the users demand4. The
random variable is drawn from a finite set M over time in an
i.i.d. fashion. The distribution of M(t) may not be known by
the operator.
At a time t, the operator will decide whether to accept new
file downloading requests from newly arrived secondary users.
We define the binary demand control variable as O(t),
where O(t) = 1 means that the operator accepts the incoming
requests in time t, and O(t) = 0 otherwise. When the operator
decides to accept new requests of packet transmissions, it will
also announce a price q(t) for transmitting one packet
(to any user). This price will affect the users’ incentives of
downloading requests, e.g., when price q(t) is high, some users
may choose to postpone their requests.
More precisely, we denote the number of incoming users at
time t as a discrete random variable N(t) ∆= N (M(t), q(t)) ∈
{0, 1, 2 . . .}, the distribution of which is a function of the
transmission price q(t) and market state M(t). Further, a
user n’s requested file size is denoted Ln(t), with n ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N(q(t))}, which is assumed to be independent of
each other and does not depend on q(t) or M(t). Moreover,
we assume that users are using a set K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} of
different applications, and denote θk as the probability that an
incoming user is using application k ∈ K with
∑K
k=1 θk = 1.
The distributions of the file length for different applications
can be different, and we denote lk as the expected file length
of application k ∈ K.
To summarize, users’ instantaneous demand at time t is
A(t)
∆
=
N(M(t),q(t))∑
n=1
Ln(t), (7)
which is a random variable due to random file sizes and
the random number of incoming users (even given q(t) and
M(t)). We define the users’ (expected) demand function
as D(t)
∆
= D (M(t), q(t))
∆
= E [A (M(t), q(t))], and its
value is completely determined by M(t) and q(t). We can
calculate that D(M(t), q(t)) = E [N(M(t), q(t))]
∑
k∈K θklk.
Then it is reasonable to assume that the operator can rather
accurately characterize the expected number of incoming users
E [N(M(t), q(t))] through long-term observations. Thus the
demand function D(M(t), q(t)) is known by the operator.
We further assume that the instantaneous demand is upper-
bounded as A(t) ≤ Amax for all t, and that the demand
function D(t) is non-negative and non-increasing function of
the price q(t). When the price is higher than some upper-
bound, i.e., q(t) ≥ qmax, the demand function D(t) will be
zero. The optimization of O(t) and q(t) based on the demand
function will be further discussed in Section 5.2.1.
4. For example, M(t) can be users’ willingness to pays, or whether the
system is in peak time or off-peak time.
53.6 Queuing dynamics
Since we focus on the profit maximization problem in this
paper, we will take a simple view of the network and model
users’ dynamic arrivals and departures as a single server queue.
When a user accesses the network, the corresponding file
will be queued in a server at the base station, waiting to
be transmitted to the user according to the First Come First
Serve (FCFS) discipline. Shama and Lin in [29] showed that
the single server queue model is a good approximation for
an OFDM system, especially when the number of users and
channels are large.
We denote the queue length (i.e., the backlog, or the
number of all packets from all queued files) at time t as Q(t).
Thus the queuing dynamic can be written as
Q(t+ 1) =
(
Q(t)− r(t)
)+
+O(t)A(t), (8)
where (a)+ ∆= max(a, 0), r(t) and A(t) are the transmission
rate and incoming rate at time t, and O(t) is the binary demand
control variable (i.e., O(t) = 1 means the operator admit the
users’ transmission requests at time t). Throughout the paper,
we adopt the following notion of queue stability:
Q
∆
= lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
E [Q(τ)] <∞. (9)
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
For notation convenience, we introduce several condensed
notations and use them together with the original notations.
We define φ(t) ∆= (M(t),h(t), Cl(t)) as observable pa-
rameters, including the market state M(t), channel conditions
(vector) h(t), and the leasing price Cl(t) in the spectrum
market. Based on previous assumptions, φ(t)’s are i.i.d over
time and take values from a finite set Φ.
We define γ(t) ∆= (O(t), q(t), Cs(t),Bs(t),Bl(t),P (t)) as
decision variables, including the demand control variable
O(t), the transmission price for users q(t), the sensing cost
(with the corresponding sensing technology) Cs(t), the set of
sensing channels Bs(t), the set of leasing channels Bl(t), and
power allocations (vector) P (t) of the operator. We assume
that γ(t) takes values form a countable (finite or infinite) set
Γφ(t), which is a Cartesian product of the feasible regions
of all variables, i.e., non-negative values satisfying constraints
(1), (3), and (4). With the condensed notations, functions in
this paper can be simply represented as functions of γ(t) with
parameter φ(t).
We further define the instantaneous profit in time t
R(t)
∆
= R(γ(t);φ(t))
∆
= q(t)O(t)A(t) − Cs(t)|Bs(t)| − Cl(t)|Bl(t)|. (10)
The time average profit is denoted as
R
∆
= lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
E [R(t)].
All expectations in this paper are taken with respect to system
parameters φ(t) unless stated otherwise.
We look at the profit maximization problem through pricing
determination and resource allocations. At the beginning of
each time slot t, the operator observes the value of φ(t) and
makes a decision γ(t) to maximize the time average profit,
subject to the system stability constraint (11) and the collision
upper-bound requirement (12). The Profit Maximization (PM)
problem is formulated as
PM: Maximize R
Subject to Q <∞, (11)
Xi ≤ ηi, i ∈ B
s
max, (12)
Variables γ(t) ∈ Γφ(t), ∀t,
Parameters φ(t), ∀t.
We represent its optimal solution as γ∗(t) =(
O∗(t), q∗(t), Cs∗(t),Bs∗(t),Bl∗(t),P ∗(t)
)
, and denote
R
∗
as the maximum profit. The PM problem is an infinite
horizon stochastic optimization problem, which is in general
hard to solve directly, especially when the distribution of
dynamic parameter φ(t) is unknown. For example, the future
leasing price is hard to predict due to the dynamic supplies
and demands in the market; and the primary users’ activities
can not be estimated precisely before hand.
5 PROFIT MAXIMIZATION CONTROL POLICY
Now, we adopt Lyapunov stochastic optimization technique to
solve the PM problem.
5.1 Lyapunov stochastic optimization
We first introduce a virtual queue for constraint (12), and then
derive the optimal control policy to solve the PM problem
through the technique of drift-plus-penalty function minimiza-
tion [30].
We denote Zi(t) as the number of collisions happening
in sensing channel i ∈ Bsmax. The counter Zi(t) can be
understood as a “virtual queue”, in which the incoming rate is
Xi(t), and the serving rate is ηi (the collision tolerant level).
The queue dynamic is
Zi(t+ 1) =
(
Zi(t)− ηi
)+
+Xi(t), (13)
with Zi(0) = 0. By this notion, if the virtual queue is stable,
then it implies that the average incoming rate is no larger than
the average serving rate. This is just the same as the collision
upper-bound constraint (12).
We introduce the general queue length vector Θ(t) ∆=
{Q(t),Z(t)}. We then define the Lyapunov function
L(Θ(t))
∆
=
1
2
[
Q(t)2 +
∑
i∈Bs
max
Zi(t)
2
]
,
and the Lyapunov drift
∆(Θ(t))
∆
= E
[
L(Θ(t+ 1))− L(Θ(t))|Θ(t)
]
. (14)
According to the Lyapunov stochastic optimization tech-
nique, we can obtain instantaneous control policy that can
solve the PM problem though minimizing some upper bound
of the following drift-plus-penalty function in every slot t:
∆(Θ(t))− V E [R(t)|Θ(t)]. (15)
There are two terms in the above function. The first term is
the Lyapunov drift defined in (14). It is shown by Lyapunov
6stochastic optimization [30] that we can achieve the system
stabilities (i.e., constraints (11) and (12) of the PM problem)
by showing the existence of a constant upper bound for the
drift function. The second term in (15) is just the objective of
the PM problem, i.e., to minimize the minus profit, which
is equivalent to maximize the profit. Here parameter V is
introduced to achieve the desired tradeoff between profit and
queuing delay in the control policy. We first find an upper
bound for (15).
By the queue dynamic (8), we have
Q(t+1)2 ≤ (Q(t)−r(t))2+A(t)2+2Q(t)O(t)A(t)
= Q(t)2+r(t)2 +A(t)2+2Q(t)(O(t)A(t)−r(t)) . (16)
Similarly, for virtual queue (13), we have
Zi(t+1)
2 ≤ Zi(t)
2+η2i +Xi(t)
2+2Zi(t)(Xi(t)−ηi). (17)
Substituting (16) and (17) into (15), we have
∆(Θ(t))− V E [R(t)|Θ(t)] ≤ D −D1(t)
− V E
[
q(t)O(t)A(t)−Cs(t)|Bs(t)|−Cl(t)|Bl(t)||Θ(t)
]
+Q(t)E [O(t)A(t) − r(t)|Θ(t)] +
∑
i∈Bs
max
Zi(t)E [Xi(t)|Θ(t)]
where D is a positive constant satisfying the following condi-
tion for all t,
D≥
1
2
E[r(t)2+(O(t)A(t))2|Θ(t)]+∑
i∈Bs
max
E
[
Xi(t)
2+η2i |Θ(t)
],
and D1(t)
∆
=
∑
i∈Bs
max
Zi(t)ηi is a known constant at time t,
since the values of Zi(t)s are known at time t.
To further simplify the above expression, we introduce two
new notations: channel selection B(t) ∆= Bs(t) ∪ Bl(t), and
channel cost
Ci(t)
∆
=
{
C˜s(t), if i ∈ Bs(t),
Cl(t), if i ∈ Bl(t),
(18)
where C˜s(t) is the virtual sensing cost and is defined as
C˜s(t)
∆
= Cs(t) + (1/V )Zi(t)E [Xi(t)|Θ(t)]. Note that this
virtual sensing cost depends not only on the sensing cost but
also on the collision history in this channel. More frequent past
collisions in this channel will increase the virtual sensing cost,
hence makes the operator more conservative about choosing
this sensing channel. It then follows:
∆(Θ(t))− V E [R(t)|Θ(t)] ≤ D −D1(t)
+ V E
[(
Q(t)
V
− q(t)
)
O(t)A(t)
∣∣∣∣Θ(t)]
+ V E
 ∑
i∈B(t)
Ci(t)−
Q(t)ri(t)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣Θ(t)
 , (19)
where we use the fact that collisions between secondary and
primary users can only happen in channels that are chosen
for sensing, i.e., i ∈ Bs(t). Next we propose the Profit
Maximization Control (PMC) policy to minimize the right
hand side of inequality (19) for each time t.
5.2 Profit Maximization Control (PMC) policy
It is clear that minimizing the right hand side of (19) is
equivalent to minimizing the last two terms in (19). Note that
the last two terms are decouple in decision variables, thus we
have the two parallel parts in the PMC policy as follows:
5.2.1 Revenue Maximization
Here we determine two variables: the transmission price q(t)
and the market control decision O(t). The optimal transmis-
sion price q(t) is obtained by solving the following revenue
maximization problem:
Maximize q(t)D (q(t),M(t))−Q(t)
V
D (q(t),M(t)) (20)
Variables q(t) ≥ 0
To obtain the above problem formulation of revenue
maximization, we use the fact that the demand function
D(M(t), q(t))
∆
= E [A(t)], which is independent of the queu-
ing states of the system.
Note that the first term in (20) is just the revenue that
the operator collects from its users. The second term can be
viewed as a shift of the queuing effect, which is introduced
by the Lyapunov drift for system stability.
If the maximum objective in (20) (under the optimal choice
of q(t)) is positive, the operator sets the demand control
variable O(t) = 1 and accepts the present incoming requests
A(t) at the price q(t). Otherwise, the operator sets O(t) = 0
and rejects any new requests.
5.2.2 Cost Minimization
We determine channels selection B(t), sensing technology
(or cost) Cs(t), and power allocation P (t), by solving the
following optimization problem to control the costs of the
operator to provide transmission services to its users.
Minimize
∑
i∈B(t)
Ci(t)−
Q(t)
V
E [ri(t)|Θ] (21)
Subject to (1), (3), (4)
Variables Cs(t),Bs(t),Bl(t), Pi(t) ≥ 0
To obtain the above problem formulation of cost minimiza-
tion, we use the fact that Xi(t) = (1 − Si(t))Wi(t), which
is independent of the queuing state. Thus the virtual sensing
cost can be updated as C˜s(t) = Cs(t) + (1/V )Zi(t)(1 −
p0)Pmd(C
s(t)), which increases with the virtual queue and
missed detection probability.
Note that the first term in the summation in (21) is the
cost of each channel. The second term in the summation is a
queuing-weighted expected transmission rate, again is a shift
introduced by Lyapunov drift for system stability. This shift
can be also viewed as the “gain” collected from the channel
to help clear the queue.
5.2.3 Intuitions behind the PMC policy
We discuss some intuitions behind the PMC policy. To
maximize the profit, the operator needs to perform revenue
maximization and cost minimization. To guarantee the queuing
stability, some shifts (i.e., all queue-related terms) are intro-
duced by the Lyapunov drift in these problems. In Appendix
7Section D, we show that the queueing effect will increase the
optimal price announced by the operator (comparing with not
considering queueing), as a higher price will reduce the users’
demands and maintain the system stability.
The Lyapunov stochastic optimization approach provides
a way to decompose a long-term average goal (e.g., the
PM problem) into instantaneous optimization problems (e.g.,
revenue maximization and cost minimization problems in the
PMC policy). In the stochastic optimization problem, the
current decisions always have impacts on the future prob-
lems. These impacts are characterized and incorporated by
the queueing shift terms in the instantaneous optimization
problems. Therefore, we can achieve the long term goal
through focusing on the instantaneous decisions in every time
slot. The flowchart for the PMC policy is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Flowchart of the dynamic PMC policy
Although the revenue maximization problem is relatively
easy to solve, the cost minimization problem is very com-
plicated. It is actually a two-stage decision problem. In the
first stage, the operator determines the sensing technology,
and chooses which channels to sense and which channels to
lease. Then spectrum sensing is performed to identify available
channels. With this information, the operator further allocates
downlink transmission power in the available channels (sensed
idle ones and leasing ones). In Section 5.3, we focus on
designing algorithms to solve the cost minimization problem.
5.3 Algorithms for Cost Minimization Problem
Now we use backward induction to solve the cost mimmation
problem.
5.3.1 The Second Stage Problem
We first analyze the power allocation in the second stage,
where the sensing results Wi(t), the channel selection Bs(t),
and the sensing technology Cs(t) have been determined.
Therefore, the power allocation problem of (21) is as follows:
Maximize
∑
i∈B(t)
ωi(t) log (1 + hi(t)Pi(t)) (22)
Subject to
∑
i∈Bmax
Pi(t) ≤ Pmax,
Variables Pi(t) ≥ 0
where
ωi(t)
∆
=
{
ω0
∆
= E [Si(t)|Wi(t) = 1], if i ∈ Bs(t),
1, if i ∈ Bl(t).
(23)
and we can calculate
E [Si(t)|Wi(t) = 1]
=
p0(1− Pfa(C
s(t)))
p0(1− Pfa(Cs(t))) + (1− p0)Pmd(Cs(t))
. (24)
By using the Lagrange duality theory, we can show that the
problem (22) has the following optimal solution
P ∗i (t) =
ωi(t)
(
1
λ(t) −
1
ωi(t)hi(t)
)+
i ∈ B(t),
0 i /∈ B(t),
(25)
where λ(t) is the Lagrange multiplier of the total power
constraint (4). The optimal value of λ(t) is the following water
filling solution,
λ(t) =
∑
i∈Bp(t)
ωi(t)
Pmax +
∑
i∈Bp(t)
1
hi(t)
, (26)
where Bp(t)
∆
= {i ∈ B(t) : Pi(t) > 0}. Note that (26) is a
fixed-point equation of λ(t), and the precise value of λ(t) is
not given here.
When the values of all parameters (i.e., hi(t), ωi(t)) are
given, we can use a simple water level searching Algorithm 1
and similar as the searching algorithms in [32], [33]) to
determine the exact optimal value of λ(t). In the following
pseudo code of Algorithm 1, we define a function Λ(m) as
follows:
Λ(m)
∆
=
∑m
i=1 ωi
Pmax +
∑m
i=1
1
hi
.
Algorithm 1 Power Allocation
1: Rearrange the channel indices i ∈ Bmax as a decreasing
order of ωi(t)hi(t)
2: m← |B(t)|, λ⇐ Λ(m)
3: while λ ≥ hm(t)ωm(t) do
4: m← m− 1
5: λ⇐ Λ(m)
6: end while
The main complexity in this algorithm is to sort the channels
according to the channel gains. We can adopt established sort-
ing algorithms [34] to obtain the index rearrangement with a
complexity O(|Bmax| log(|Bmax|)). Thus the total complexity
of Algorithm 1 is O(|Bmax|3 log(|Bmax|)).
5.3.2 The First Stage Problem
Let us consider the first stage problem to determine the sensing
technology, the sensing set, and the leasing set. Note that since
the sensing has not been performed at this stage yet, thus the
sensing result Wi(t) is not known. We denote
αi(t) =
{
α0
∆
= E [Si(t)Wi(t)] if i ∈ Bs(t)
1 if i ∈ Bl(t),
(27)
and we can calculate
E [Si(t)Wi(t)] = p0(1 − Pfa(C
s(t))) (28)
8Substitute the optimal power allocation (25) into the prob-
lem (21), we have
Minimize
∑
i∈B(t)
Ci(t)−
Q(t)
V
αi(t)
(
log
(
hi(t)ωi(t)
λ(t)
))+
(29)
Subject to Bs(t) ⊆ Bsmax, Bl(t) ⊆ Blmax, Cs(t) ∈ C
Variables Bs(t),Bl(t), Cs(t)
We first consider the above problem for a fixed sensing cost
Cs(t). This problem is a combinatorial optimization problem
of Bs(t) and Bs(t). The worst case of searching complexity
(i.e., exhaustive searching) can be O(2|Bmax|), exponential in
the number of total channels.
However, we can reduce the complexity by exploring the
special structure of this problem.
Proposition 1: (Threshold Property)
• We rearrange the leasing channel indices i ∈ Blmax in the
decreasing order of gi(t), which is defined as
gi(t)
∆
= hi(t) exp
(
−
Ci(t)
Q(t)
V
)
. (30)
There exists a threshold index ilth, such that a channel i is
chosen for leasing (i.e., i ∈ Bl(t)) if and only if i ≤ ilth.
• We rearrange the sensing channel indices j ∈ Bsmax in
the decreasing order of gj(t), which is defined as
gj(t)
∆
= ω0hj(t) exp
(
−
Cj(t)
Q(t)
V
α0
)
. (31)
For all leasing channels j ∈ Bsmax, there exists a threshold
index jsth, such that a channel j is chosen for sensing (i.e.,
j ∈ Bs(t)) if and only if j ≤ jsth.
Proof: For each channel in the optimal channel selection
set i ∈ B∗(t), it satisfies the following condition
Ci(t)≤
Q(t)
V
αi(t)
(
log
(
ωi(t)hi(t)
λ(t)
))+
. (32)
This result is easy to see from the objective function in (29):
to optimize the profit, we should only pick the channel with
its cost no larger than its gain. Thus by (30) and (31), the
optimization problem in (29) can be written in the following
equivalent form:
Maximize
∑
i∈Bl(t)
(
log
(
gi(t)
λ(t)
))+
+α0
∑
j∈Bs(t)
(
log
(
gj(t)
λ(t)
))+
(33)
Subject to Bs(t) ⊆ Bsmax, Bl(t) ⊆ Blmax
Variables Cs(t),Bs(t),Bl(t)
Thus by the log function in the objective of (33), the threshold
property immediately follows.
This proposition suggests that we should select the channel
with a large gi (for leasing channels) or gj (for sensing
channels). Note that as defined in (30) and (31), gi and gj
are equal to channel information (i.e., hi for leasing channels,
ωjhj for sensing channels) multiplying a decaying factor
related to the channel cost. They can be understood as virtual
channel gains by taking channel costs into consideration. A
large value of gi or gj means that the channel is cost-effective,
i.e., the channel has a good channel gain as well as a low cost.
By Proposition 1, it is clear that we can obtain the optimal
channel selection by an exhaustive search of the optimal
sensing and leasing thresholds. Algorithm 2 gives a pseudo
code for the searching procedure.
Algorithm 2 Optimal Channel Selection (for a given Cs(t))
1: procedure COMPUTING B(Cs(t))
2: invoke procedure SearchingThreshold(Cs) to calculate
Υl and Υs
3: U(Cs(t))← 0
4: for i = 0, 1 . . . ,Υl do
5: for j = 0, 1 . . . ,Υs do
6: Calculate λ(t) as (26) with Bp(t) = Bli ∪ Bsj
7: if gi(t) > λ(t) and gj(t) > λ(t) then
8: Calculate U(i, j)
9: if U(i, j) < U(Cs(t)) then
10: U(Cs(t))← U(i, j)
11: B(Cs(t))← Bli ∪ B
s
j
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: end procedure
In Algorithm 2, U(i, j) denotes the optimal value of (33)
with the channel selection set B = Bli ∪ Bsj . To decrease the
number of searching loops, we can first run Algorithm 5 (in
Appendix C) to determine the maximum possible thresholds
Υl for leasing channels or Υs for sensing channels. (If we do
not run Algorithm 5 , we can just set Υl = |Blmax| and Υs =
|Bsmax|. Whether we run Algorithm 5 or not, the complexity
of Algorithm 2 is no worse than O(|Bsmax| × |Blmax|).) Thus
the searching complexity is reduced to O(|Bmax|2), given the
channel indices are rearranged as in the Proposition 1. We can
adopt established sorting algorithms [34] to obtain the index
rearrangement with a complexityO(|Bmax| log(|Bmax|)). Thus
the total complexity of finding the optimal channel selection
is O(|Bmax|3 log(|Bmax|)).
Note that in real systems, the channel conditions and the
leasing cost may not change as frequently as every time slot.
We usually can update these network parameters every time
frame (which is composed by several time slots instead of
one time slot). Accordingly, the above algorithm will also be
operated based on the time frames, which will greatly reduce
the computation complexity in practice.
Furthermore, let us find the optimal sensing cost Cs(t) by
enumerating all possible sensing costs Cs(t) ∈ Cs. For the
sensing cost Cs(t), we denote the objective value in (33) as
U(Cs(t)) and the optimal channel selection set as B(Cs(t)).
The corresponding pseudo code is given in Algorithm 3, the
complexity of which is O(|C| × |Bmax|3 log(|Bmax|)).
So far, we have completely solved the two-stage optimiza-
tion problem in (21). For each time t, the operator first runs Al-
gorithm 3 to choose the channel sets B∗(t) = Bs∗(t)∪Bl∗(t).
Then it uses the sensing technology with a cost Cs∗(t) to
sense channels in Bs∗(t). Based on the sensing results, it
further runs Algorithm 1 to determine the power allocation
P ∗i (t), i ∈ B
∗(t).
9Algorithm 3 Optimal Sensing Cost and Channel Selection
1: U∗ ← 0
2: for Cs(t) ∈ Cs do
3: Determine the optimal channel selection B(Cs(t)) (see
Algorithm 2)
4: Calculate U(Cs(t))
5: if U∗ > U then
6: U∗ ← U , Cs∗(t)← Cs(t), B∗(t)← B(Cs(t))
7: end if
8: end for
5.3.3 Sensing vs. Leasing
We are also interested in how the PMC policy makes the best
tradeoff between sensing and leasing based on the sensing cost
Cs(t) and the leasing cost Cl(t). To make the comparison easy
to understand, we will consider perfect sensing with no sensing
errors (i.e., ω0 = 1 and α0 = p0). We will further assume
that a leasing channel i and a sensing channel j have the
same channel gain hi(t) = hj(t). Finally, we assume that two
channels have the same availability-price-ratio, i.e., the costs
satisfy Cs(t) = α0Cl(t). We want to answer the following
question: is the PMC policy indifferent in choosing either of
the two channel?
By (30) and (31), we have gi = gj for these two channels.
By (33), we can calculate the net gains by channel i and
j:
(
log
(
gi(t)
λ(t)
))+
≥ α0
(
log
(
gj(t)
λ(t)
))+
. To maximize the
objective in (33), it is clear that PMC policy will prefer the
leasing channel i over the sensing channel j, and this tendency
increases as α0 decreases. If we view the channel unavailabil-
ity (1−α0) as the risk of choosing the sensing channel, then
the PMC policy is a risk averse one. This is mainly due to
the concavity of the rate function. This preference order will
also hold in the imperfect sensing case, in which case we will
have gi > gj and
(
log
(
gi(t)
λ(t)
))+
≥ α0
(
log
(
gj(t)
λ(t)
))+
.
5.4 Performance of the PMC Policy
We can characterize the performance of the PMC Policy as
follows:
Theorem 1: For any positive value V , the PMC Policy has
the following properties:
(a) The queue stability (11) and collision constraints (12) are
satisfied. The queue length is upper bounded by
Q(t) ≤ Qmax
∆
= V qmax+Amax, ∀ t; (34)
and the virtual queue length is upper-bounded by
Zi(t) ≤ Zmax
∆
= κ(V qmax +Amax) + 1, ∀ i, t. (35)
where
κ
∆
=
rmaxp0(1− Pfa(Cs0)))
(1− p0)Pmd(Cs0)
and Cs0 ∆= max
Cs
p0(1−Pfa(C
s)))
(1−p0)Pmd(Cs)
.
(b) The average profit RPMC obtained by the PMC policy
satisfies
inf RPMC ≥ R
∗
−O(1/V ), (36)
where R∗ is the optimal value of the PM problem.
According to the Little’s law, the average queuing delay
is proportional to the queue length. Thus users experience
bounded queuing delays under the PMC algorithm by (34).
By (36), we find that the profit obtained by the PMC Policy
can be made closer to the optimal profit by increasing V .
However, as V increases, the queuing delay also increases as
shown in (34). The best choice of V depends on the desired
trade-off between queuing delay and profit optimality.
A detailed proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendices A
and B.
5.5 Extension: More General Model of Primary Ac-
tivities
In the previous analysis, we have assumed that primary
users’ activities in each sensing channel follow a simple i.i.d.
Bernoulli random process. Next we will show that the PMC
policy can be easily adapted to the more general Markov
chain model of the primary users’ activities shown in Fig. 3.
In this model, for any time t, Si(t) is unknown, but the
history information Si(t−1) is known, and also the transition
probabilities Pr(Si(t) = s′|Si(t − 1) = s)
∆
= pis→s′ , s ∈
{0, 1}, s′ ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ Bsmax are known from long-time
statistics.
 
p1 0
p0 1
p0 0p1 1
Fig. 3. Markov chain model of the PUs’ activities
All previous analysis for PMC policy will still hold if we
update two parameters ωi(t) and αi(t) as follows:
ωi(t)
∆
=
{
E [Si(t)|Wi(t) = 1, Si(t− 1)], if i ∈ Bs(t)
1, if i ∈ Bl(t)
where
E [Si(t)|Wi(t) = 1, Si(t− 1) = s]
=
pis→1(1− Pfa(C
s(t)))
pis→1(1− Pfa(C
s(t))) + ps→0Pmd(Cs(t))
;
and
αi(t) =
{
E [Si(t)Wi(t)|Si(t− 1)] if i ∈ Bs(t)
1 if i ∈ Bl(t)
where
E [Si(t)Wi(t)|Si(t− 1) = s] = p
i
s→1(1− Pfa(C
s(t))).
There is no change in the revenue maximization part,
and the cost minimization part still involves a combinatorial
optimization problem. But the complexity of solving cost
minimization problem becomes O(|C| × 2|Bsmax||Blmax + 1|),
since we lose the structure information in sensing channels,
i.e., the threshold structure does not hold for sensing channels.
In the worst case (Bmax = Bsmax, Blmax = ∅ ), it comes back
to O(|C|×2|Bmax|), which is the complexity of the exhaustive
search without considering the threshold structure.
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Fig. 4. Heterogeneous user model: Users in a hexagons
are nearby homogeneous users, who have the same
channel experience. Users in deferent hexagons can have
different channel experience.
Let us further consider a special Markov chain model where
the transition probability for each sensing channel is the same,
i.e., Pr(Si(t) = s′|Si(t−1) = s)
∆
= ps→s′ , ∀i ∈ Bsmax. In this
model, all sensing channels can be categorized into two types,
channels being busy in the last slot (i.e., Si(t − 1) = 0), or
channels being idle in the last slot (i.e., Si(t − 1) = 1). We
can still show threshold structures for both types. Thus the
complexity is reduced to O(|C| × |Bmax|4 log(|Bmax|)).
The above analysis shows that it is critical to exploit the
problem structure to reduce the algorithm complexity.
6 HETEROGENEOUS USERS
In Section 4, we adopt the single queue analysis for homoge-
neous users who are assumed to be located nearby and have
the same channel condition on each channel. However, the
single queue analysis no longer works for a more general
scenario of heterogeneous users, where users can be located
at different places, and have different channel conditions. In
this section, we introduce the multi-queue model to deal with
the heterogenous user scenario as shown in Fig. 4.
We divide the total coverage of the secondary base station
into J ∆= {1, 2, . . . , J} disjoint small areas (illustrated as
hexagons in Fig. 4) according to users’ different channel
experiences. Users in one of these small area are nearby
homogeneous users. They share the same channel conditions,
and form a queue based on the FCFS discipline. We use Qj(t)
to denote the queue length in area j. Since the queue and the
corresponding area is one-to-one mapping, we also call the
users in area j as queue j users.
For each queue j ∈ J , hij(t) represents the users’ channel
gain to channel i ∈ Bmax at time t, which follows an i.i.d
distribution over time. The indicator variable Tij(t) ∈ {0, 1}
denotes the operator’s channel assignment at time t:
Tij(t) = 1 if channel i is allocated to queue j, and Tij(t) = 0
otherwise. Meanwhile, the assignment Tij must satisfy∑
j∈J
Tij(t) ≤ 1, ∀t. (37)
The power allocation for queue j on channel i is denoted
by Pij(t). The total power allocation must satisfy∑
j∈J
∑
i∈Bmax
Pij(t) ≤ Pmax, ∀t, (38)
Thus the rate of queue j ∈ J can be calculated
rj(t) =
∑
i∈B(t)
Ii(t)Tij(t) log
(
1 +
hij(t)Pij(t)
Tij(t)
)
(39)
where Ii(t) is the transmission result in channel i, following
the same definition in Section 3.4.
For each queue j, we follow the same demand model as in
Section 3.5 for homogenous users. We assume the number of
incoming users, the market state, and the user’s instantaneous
demand are i.i.d among different queues, and denote them
as Nj(t), Mj(t), and Aj(t) respectively. The market control
variable and price for queue j are denoted as Oj(t) and qj(t).
The queuing dynamic for queue j is as follows:
Qj(t+ 1) = (Qj(t)− rj(t))
+
+Oj(t)Aj(t). (40)
Thus the homogeneous user model in Section 4 can also be
viewed as a special case of the heterogeneous user model,
where J is a singleton.
6.1 Multi-queue Profit Maximization Control Policy
6.1.1 Revenue Maximization
For any queue j ∈ J , we compute the optimal transmission
price q∗j (t) by solving the following problem.
Maximize
(
qj(t)−
Qj(t)
V
)
D (qj(t),Mj(t)) (41)
Variables qj(t) ≥ 0
If the maximum objective in (41) is positive, the operator sets
transmission control variable O∗j (t) = 1 and accepts users’
new file download requests at the price q∗j (t). Otherwise, the
operator sets O∗j (t) = 0 and rejects any new requests.
6.1.2 Cost Minimization
We solve the following optimization problem to determine
sensing cost and resource allocation:
Minimize
∑
i∈B(t)
Ci(t)−
∑
j∈J
Qj(t)
V
E [rj(t)] (42)
Subject to (1), (3), (38), (37)
Variables Cs(t),Bs(t),Bl(t), Pij(t) ≥ 0, Tij(t) ∈ {0, 1}
where the cost Ci(t) follows the same definition of (18).
Similar to the homogenous model in Section5.3, it is a two-
stage decision problem. In the first stage, we determine the
sensing technology, and choose the sensing channels and the
leasing channels. Then in the second stage, we determine the
channel assignment and power allocation based on the sensing
results. We use backward induction to solve this problem (42).
To simplify the notation, we will ignore the time index in the
following analysis.
We first analyze the channel assignment and power allo-
cation in the second stage. In this stage, since the sensing
results Wi, the channels Bs, and the sensing technology Cs
are determined, the second stage problem of (21) is shown as
follows:
Maximize
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈B
QjωiTij log
(
1 +
hijPij
Tij
)
(43)
Subject to (38), (37)
Variables Pij ≥ 0, Tij ∈ {0, 1}
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where ωi follows the same definition of (23).
Compared to the power allocation problem in (22), the
binary channel assignment variables Tij’s make the second
stage problem in (43) much more complex.
We first solve problem (43) assuming fixed Tij’s, in which
case the power allocation problem is a convex optimization
problem. Following the same method of solving power allo-
cation for homogeneous users as in (25), we have
Pij = TijQjωi
(
1
λ
−
1
Qjωihij
)+
, i ∈ B. (44)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the total power constraint
(38), which satisfies
λ =
∑
i∈Bp
ωiQjTij
Pmax +
∑
i∈Bp
Tij
hi(t)
, (45)
where Bp
∆
= {i ∈ B : Pij > 0}. When Tij is known, we can
design a simple search algorithm similar to Alg. 1 to determine
the optimal value of λ.
We then substitute this result in (43), and further maximize
the objective over Tij’s. Then we have
Maximize
∑
i∈B
ωi
∑
j∈J
QjTij
(
log
(
ωiQihi
λ
))+
(46)
Subject to
∑
j∈J
Tij ≤ 1
Variables Tij ∈ {0, 1}
For each channel i ∈ B, let us denote the set
J ∗i
∆
=argmax
j∈J
Qj
(
log
(
ωiQjhij
λ
))+
(47)
Here the solution J ∗i is a set of indices of the chosen queues.
If J ∗i is a singleton, then we denote its unique element as j∗i .
If J ∗ is not singleton, since all elements in J ∗ lead to the
same value in objective, then we can randomly pick one of
the its element and denote it as j∗i .
Since the objective in problem (46) is linear in Tij , it is
easy to see the optimal solution is
Tij =
{
1, if j = j∗i , i ∈ B
0, otherwise.
(48)
Now let us consider how to calculate the value of λ and
j∗i . By (45) and (47), we find that they are actually coupled
together. To determine λ in (45), we need to know Tij (or
equivalently J ∗i , j∗i ), i.e., which queue is chosen for which
channel. But determining J ∗i in (47) requires the value of
λ. One way to solve this problem is to enumerate every
possible channel assignment combinations to find the solutions
satisfying both (45) and (47). Since each channel i ∈ Bmax can
be assigned to one of J queues, there are a total of |Bmax|J
channel assignment combinations. When the J or |Bmax| is
large, the complexity can be very high. However, we can
reduce the search complexity by exploring the special structure
of the problem.
Property 1: For each channel allocated positive power i ∈
Bp, we have
J ∗i = argmax {Qj |hij >
λ
Qjωi
, j ∈ J }. (49)
This property comes from (47). This means that for a
particular channel i, if the channel gain for the longest queue
Qj is good enough (i.e., hij > λQjωi ), we should assign
channel i to queue with the longest queue length. If J ∗i is a
singleton, then we denote its unique element as j∗i . Otherwise,
we denote Jˆ ∗i
∆
= argmax {hij | j ∈ J ∗i }. In this case, there
are multiple channels with the same channel gain and the
same queue length, and we can randomly pick one and denote
it as j∗i . Thus we can search λ and J ∗i (and also j∗i ) by a
simple greedy algorithm as follows. First, for all channels, we
assume J ∗i = argmaxj∈J Qj , and calculate the value of λ
by the waterfilling algorithm (as the procedure “Waterfilling”
in Alg. 4). For each unchosen channel, i.e., the channel i
with ωiQj∗
i
hij∗
i
≤ λ, we check whether ωiQjhij > λ can be
satisfied when another queue is chosen instead of j∗i . If there
is some set J˜i of queues satisfying ωiQjhij > λ, we replace
J ∗i with the one with the longest queue length in this set,
i.e., argmaxj∈J˜i Qj . We repeat the process iteratively until
we find the λ and j∗i that satisfies both (45) and (47). The
pseudo code is given in Alg. 4. To simplify the expression of
Alg. 4, with a little abuse of notations, we denote hi = hij∗
i
,
Qi = Qj∗
i
, and Λ(m) ∆=
∑
m
i=1 ωiQi
Pmax+
∑
m
i=1
1
hi
.
Algorithm 4 Channel Assignment
1: J ∗i ← argmaxj∈J Qj
2: procedure WATERFILLING(hi(t), Qi(t))
3: Rearrange the channel indices i ∈ Bmax in the de-
creasing order of ωi(t)Qi(t)hi(t)
4: m← |B(t)|, λ⇐ Λ(m)
5: while λ ≥ hm(t)ωm(t) do
6: m← m− 1
7: λ⇐ Λ(m)
8: end while
9: end procedure
10: while ωi(t)hij(t)Qj(t) > λ, ∀j, ∀i > m, do
11: J ∗i ← argmax {Qj|ωi(t)hij(t)Qj(t) > λ}
12: invoke procedure Waterfilling( hi(t), Qi(t))
13: end while
The complexity of Alg. 4 is O(|Bmax|3 log(|Bmax|), since
the while loop runs no more than |Bmax| times in the
worst case, and the complexity of waterfilling part is
O(|Bmax|2 log(|Bmax|) (the same as the waterfilling power al-
location algorithm in Section 5.3.1). Compared to the exhaus-
tive search, the complexity of solving the channel assignment
is greatly reduced.
With the solution of channel assignment, we can update the
power allocation solution of (42) as
P ∗ij =
ωiQj
(
1
λ
− 1
ωiQjhi
)+
, if j = j∗, i ∈ B,
0 otherwise,
where the value of λ, hi and Qi are calculated by Alg. 4.
After solving the second stage problem, we move to the first
stage. Following the channel assignment in (48), we find that
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the first stage problem for the heterogeneous users is the same
with the one of homogeneous users problem in (29). We can
simply run the same Alg. 3 to determine sensing technology
Cs∗(t), sensing channel set Bs∗(t) and leasing channel set
Bl∗(t).
6.2 The Performance of M-PMC Policy
Next we show the performance bounds of the M-PMC Policy.
The proof method is similar to that of Theorem 1, and the
details are omitted due to space limit.
Theorem 2: For any positive value V , the M-PMC Policy
has the following properties:
(a) The queue stability (11) and collision constraints (12) are
satisfied. The queue length is upper bounded by
Qj(t) ≤ Q
max ∆= V qmax+Amax, ∀ t, (50)
and the virtual queues are bounded by
Zi(t) ≤ Z
max ∆= κ(V qmax + Amax) + 1, ∀ i, t. (51)
where κ ∆= rmaxp0 p0(1−Pfa(C
s(t)))+(1−p0)Pmd(C
s(t))
(1−p0)
,
and Cs0 denotes the highest sensing cost.
(b) The average profit RM−PMC obtained by the M-PMC
policy satisfies
inf RM−PMC ≥ R
∗
−O(1/V ), (52)
where R∗ is the optimal value of the multi-queue PM
problem.
7 SIMULATION
In this section we provide simulation results for PMC and
M-PMC policies.
We conduct simulations with the following parameters. The
number of incoming users in each slot satisfies a Poisson
distribution with a rate D(q(t),M(t)) = 1
M(t) (q(t)−5)
2
. The
market state M(t) satisfies Bernoulli distribution, M(t) = 1
with probability 0.5, and M(t) = 2 with probability 0.5. The
file length of each user satisfies the i.i.d. (discrete) uniform
distribution between 1 and 10. There are 32 channels in total.
20 of them belong to the sensing band Bsmax, and the rest
12 channels belong to the leasing band Blmax. The primary
collision probability tolerant levels are set as ηi = 0.001
for sensing channel i = 1, 2, . . . , 10, and ηi = 0.005 for
sensing channel i = 11, 12, . . . , 20. The channel gain hi of
each channel satisfies i.i.d. (continuous) Rayleigh distribution
with parameter σ = 4.5 The total power constraint of the
base station is Pmax = 8. There are 3 different sensing
technologies with costs Cs = {0 (not sensing at all), 0.1, 0.5}.
The corresponding false alarm probabilities are Pfa =
{0.5, 0.1, 0.008}, and the missed detection probabilities are
Pmd = {0.5, 0.08, 0.005}. We assume the idle time proba-
bility of sensing band p0 is 0.6, and the control parameter
V ∈ {5, 10, 50, 100, 200}.
Figure 5 shows a collision situation of all sensing channels
with the control parameter V = 100. We find that primary
users’ collision tolerant bound (12) is satisfied as time in-
creases. We also find that we obtain similar curves for the
collision probabilities with other values of control parameter
V .
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Fig. 5. A collision situation of all sensing channels with
V = 100
Figure. 6 (a) shows that the average queue length grows
linearly in V , and is always less than the worst case bound
V qmax + Amax. Figure. 6 (b) shows that the average profit
achieved by PMC policy converges quickly as V grows, and
is close to the maximum profit when V ≥ 100.
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Average profit vs. Parameter V
We further vary the idle time probability of sensing band p0
from 0 to 1. In Fig. 7, we show the average profit with different
sensing available probabilities p0 ∈ [0, 1] and different fixed
sensing technologies. The black curve is with zero sensing
cost, where Pfa = Pmd = 0.5, which means the operator
does not perform sensing and takes random guesses of primary
users’ activities in sensing channels. The blue curve is with
the low sensing cost 0.1, where Pfa = 0.1 and Pmd = 0.08.
The purple curve is with the high sensing cost 0.5, where
Pfa = 0.008 and Pmd = 0.005. The red curve is the
PMC policy, which adaptively choose sensing cost from the
above three (sensing cost Cs = 0, 0.1, 0.5). When the sensing
available probability is small (e.g., p0 ∈ [0, 0.2]), all strategies
tend to only choose the leasing channels, thus all curves obtain
similar profits. When the sensing available probability p0
further increases, the advantage of exploring sensing channels
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becomes more significant. The performances for strategies
using the zero and low sensing cost are not good. The reason is
that their detection accuracy is not good enough. To achieve
the primary users’ collision bounds, these strategies choose
sensing channels less often, and replace with more expensive
leasing channels. When the sensing available probability is
high and close to 1, sensing seems unnecessary. Therefore,
the performance increases as sensing cost decreases, where the
zero cost is the best and the high cost is the worst. The PMC
policy (the red curve) adaptively chooses the sensing cost, i.e.,
when p0 is medium, it utilizes the high sensing cost strategy in
most of time slots; as p0 keeps increasing, it gradually changes
to utilize the low cost and zero cost strategies more frequently;
and when p0 goes to 1, it utilizes the zero sensing cost strategy
in most of time slots. It has the best performance, since it can
take advantage of different sensing technologies for different
sensing available probabilities.
For the M-PMC policy, we conduct simulations for a simple
two-queue system. For queue-1, the channel gain hi1 of each
channel satisfies i.i.d. (continuous) Rayleigh distributions with
parameter σ = 4.5. For queue-2, the channel gain hi2 of each
channel satisfies i.i.d. (continuous) Rayleigh distributions with
parameter σ = 5.5. This is because queue-2 users are closer
to the operator’s base station than queue-1 users.
Figure 8 (a) shows that the average transmission rate
obtained by queue-2 users is higher than that of the queue-
1 users. This is because queue-2 users usually have better
channel conditions, and M-PMC policy prefers to allocate
more powers to better channels to improve the transmission
rate. Figure 8 (b) shows that the revenues obtained by the
operator from users of two queues are almost the same when
all queues are stable. It is an interesting observation. We can
understand it in this way: when two queues make different
revenue, to maximize the profit (also the revenue), the operator
will allocate more transmission rates to the queue with a
higher revenue. Thus the length of the queue with a higher
transmission rate will be shortened, and the negative queuing
effect in revenue maximization problem will be soon diluted.
It further leads to a decreasing price and a decreasing revenue.
In contrast, the length of the queue with a lower transmission
rate increases, which results in an increasing price and an
increasing revenue. Therefore, when all queues are stable
finally, the average revenue generated by each queue is the
same.
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8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the profit maximization problem of
a cognitive mobile virtual network operator in a dynamic
network environment. We propose low-complexity PMC and
M-PMC policies which perform both revenue maximization
with pricing and market control, and cost minimization with
proper resource investment and allocation. We show that these
policies can achieve arbitrarily close to the optimal profit, and
have flexible trade-offs between profit optimality and queuing
delay.
We also find several interesting features in these close-
to-optimal policies. In revenue maximization, the dynamic
pricing strategy performs the functionality of congestion con-
trol to users’ demands, i.e., the longer the queue length of
demands, the higher price the operator should charge. In cost
minimization, the operator is risk averse towards spectrum
investment, and prefers stable leasing spectrum to unstable
sensing spectrum with the same channel condition and the
same availability-price-ratio.
In this paper, we only looked at the issue of elastic traffic.
It would be worthwhile to incorporate inelastic traffic, which
usually has strict constraints on transmission rates and delays.
Typical examples include real-time multimedia applications,
e.g., audio streaming, Video on Demand (VoD), and Voice
over IP (VoIP). In the most general case, we can consider
a hybrid system with both elastic and inelastic traffic, which
is more realistic and practical. In addition, as mentioned in
Section 2, the literature about competition in cognitive radio
networks mainly focus on the static network scenario. It is
also interesting to extend our dynamic model to incorporate
competition among several network operators.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR THEOREM 1 (A)
We first prove (34) by induction.
It is easy to see that at slot t = 0, no packets are in
the network and Q(0) = 0, thus the queue length bound
(34) obviously holds. Now suppose (34) holds for time t. We
consider the queue length bound in slot t+1 in the following
cases:
• Case 1: Q(t) ≤ V qmax, then clearly Q(t+1) ≤ V qmax+
Amax.
• Case 2: Q(t) > V qmax, i.e., the objective value of the
revenue maximization (20) is negative. Therefor, accord-
ing to the optimization solution, the operator will set
O(t) = 0, and do not accept any new request, A(t) = 0.
Therefore, Q(t+ 1) ≤ Q(t) ≤ V qmax +Amax.
Likewise, we can also prove the virtual queue bound (35)
by induction. Suppose that the inequality (35) holds for time
t, and consider the following two cases.
• Case 1: Zi(t) ≤ Zmax−1, clearly the virtual queue length
bound (35) also holds at slot t+ 1.
• Case 2: Zi(t) > Zmax − 1, i.e.,
Zi(t) ≥ max
Cs
rmaxQmaxαi(t)
(1− p0)Pmd(Cs(t))
(53)
Since rmax ≥
∑
i∈Bmax
ri(t) =
∑
i∈Bmax
log
(
ωi(t)hi(t)
λ(t)
)
,
then inequality (53) implies
Ci(t)=C
s(t)+Zi(t)
1−p0
V
>αi(t) log
(
ωi(t)hi(t)
λ(t)
)
.
(54)
By (32) in the PMC policy, channel i will not be
chosen for sensing and transmission, thus there will be
no collision in this channel, i.e., Xi(t+1) = 0. Then by
(13) we have Zi(t + 1) ≤ Zi(t) and the virtual queue
length bound (35) also holds at t+ 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF FOR THEOREM 1 (B)
We first construct a stationary randomized policy that can
achieve the optimal solution of the PM problem. Let us
consider a special class of stationary randomized policies,
called the φ-only policy, which makes the decision γ(t)
in slot t only depending on the observation of system
parameter φ(t). The stationary distribution for the observ-
able parameter φ(t) is denoted as {Πφ, φ ∈ Φ}. (Recall
that we define φ(t) ∆= (M(t),h(t), Cl(t)) and γ(t) ∆=
(O(t), q(t), Cs(t),Bs(t),Bl(t),P (t)). Note that the value of
φ(t) can be chosen only from a finite set Φ.) In the φ-only
policy, when the operator observes φ(t) = φ, it chooses γ(t)
from the countable collection of Γφ(t) = {γ1φ, γ2φ, . . . } with
probabilities {ρ1φ, ρ2φ . . . }, where
∑∞
u=1 ρ
u
φ = 1. Note that the
decision is independent of time t, and thus is stationary. We
have the following fact:
There exists a stationary φ-only policy that achieves the
optimal profit of the PM problem while satisfying stability
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condition (11) and collision upper-bound requirement (12),
which is the solution of the following optimization problem:
R
∗
= Maximize
∑
φ∈Φ
Πφ
∞∑
u=1
R(γuφ ;φ)ρ
u
φ
Subject to
∑
φ∈Φ
Πφ
∞∑
u=1
r(γuφ ;φ)ρ
u
φ ≤
∑
φ∈Φ
Πφ
∞∑
u=1
D(γuφ ;φ)ρ
u
φ
∑
φ∈Φ
Πφ
∞∑
u=1
Xi(γ
u
φ ;φ)ρ
u
φ ≤ ηi, i ∈ B
s
max
The above fact is a special case of Theorem 4.5 in [30]. The
proof is omitted for brevity.
Recall that the PMC policy is derived by minimizing the
right hand side of the following inequality
∆(Θ(t))− V E [RPMC(t)|Θ(t)] ≤ D − V E [R(t)|Θ(t)]
+Q(t)E [O(t)A(t) − r(t)|Θ(t)]
+
∑
i∈Bs
max
Zi(t)E [Xi(t)− ηi|Θ(t)] . (55)
In other words, given the current queue backlogs for each
slot t, the PMC policy minimizes the right hand side of (55)
over all alternative feasible policies that could be implemented,
including the optimal stationary φ-only policy. Therefore, by
plugging the optimal stationary φ-only policy in the right hand
side of (55), we have
∆(Θ(t))− V E [RPMC(t)|Θ(t)] ≤ D − V R
∗
. (56)
Now we use the following lemma to obtain the performance
bound in Theorem 1(b).
Lemma 1: (Lyapunov Optimization) Suppose there are fi-
nite constants V > 0, D > 0, such that for all time slots
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and all possible values of Θ(t), we have
∆(Θ(t))− V E [R(t)|Θ(t)] ≤ D − V R
∗
. (57)
Then we have the following result
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
E [R(t)] ≥ R
∗
−
D
V
. (58)
The above lemma is a special case of Theorem 4.2 in [30].
The proof is omitted for brevity.
Note that the inequality (56) is exact the condition (57)
in Lemma 1, thus the performance bound in Theorem 1(b)
immediately follows.
APPENDIX C
PSEUDO CODE OF ALGORITHM 5
APPENDIX D
IMPACT OF QUEUEING ON THE REVENUE MAX-
IMIZATION PROBLEM
What is the impact of the queuing effect on the pricing
in the revenue maximization problem (20)? Let’s consider
the following instantaneous revenue maximization problem
without the queueing shift.
Maximize qD(q,M). (59)
For simplicity, we ignore the time index in the discussion.
Algorithm 5 Search Threshold Υl (or Υs) for a given Cs(t)
1: procedure SEARCHINGTHRESHOLD(Cs)
2: Rearrange the channel indecent i ∈ Blmax (or i ∈
Bsmax) as the decreasing order of gi(t).
3: m← |Blmax| (or m← |Bsmax|), λ⇐ Λ(m)
4: while λ ≥ gm(t) do
5: if m > 1 then
6: m← m− 1
7: λ⇐ Λ(m)
8: else
9: break
10: end if
11: end while
12: Υl ← m (or Υs ← m)
13: end procedure
Note that both problems in (20) and (59) may have multiple
optimal solutions. For the purpose of obtaining intuitions, we
will restrict our discussion to the case where there is a unique
optimal price for both (20) and (59). To guarantee this, we
assume that revenue R(D) ∆= qˆ(D)D is a strictly concave
function of the demand5, where qˆ(D) is defined as the inverse
demand function, i.e., qˆ(D) ∆= max{qˆ : D(qˆ,m) = D}6 for
a given m. For simplicity, we denote the optimal price in
revenue maximization (20) as q∗, and the optimal price in
revenue maximization problem (59) with the queuing shift as
q∗∗. We will show that q∗∗ ≥ q∗, i.e., the queuing effect leads
to a higher price.
The objective of revenue maximization problem in (59) can
be represented as R(D) = qˆ(D)D, and its optimal demand
is denoted as D∗. By the first order optimality condition,
D∗ satisfies that R′(D∗) = 0, where R′(·) denotes the first
order derivative of R(·). When the queuing effect is taken
into consideration, the objective of (20) can be represented
as R(D) − DQ
V
, and we denote its optimal demand as D∗∗.
Again by the first optimality condition, D∗∗ satisfies that
R′(D∗∗) = Q
V
≥ 0. Since the revenue function R(D)
is concave in D, R′(D) is a decreasing function. Since
R′(D∗∗) ≥ R′(D∗), we obtain D∗∗ ≤ D∗. Furthermore, since
the demand D(q,m) is non-increasing in price q for a given
m, we have q∗∗ ≥ q∗. In other word, when incorporating the
queuing effect, the optimal dynamic price q∗∗ in the PMC
policy is higher than the optimal price q∗ in instantaneous
revenue maximization problem without the shift. Moreover,
the larger the queue length Q, the higher the dynamic price
q in the PMC policy. When we perform such pricing in the
system, a high price will decrease the demand, which will slow
the increase of the queue length. Thus the dynamic pricing in
the PMC policy also performs the functionality of congestion
control to some extent.
For a more general case where the concavity assumption
may not be satisfied, the queueing effect depends on the shape
5. This assumption is common in the revenue management literature (e.g.,
[35]) to guarantee unique optimal pricing.
6. Since the demand function D(q,m) is non-increasing in q, there can be
multiple prices resulting the same demand.
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of the revenue function at the point D∗, i.e., q∗∗ ≥ q∗ if and
only if R′(D∗) ≤ Q
V
.
